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Abstract 
 
This study is a case study of federal logistics support during Hurricane Katrina 
disaster relief operations.  Data from federal contracts covering the first ten weeks of 
Katrina are used to measure federal logistics activity.  The study investigates whether 
chaos theory, part of complexity science, can extract information from Katrina 
contracting data to help managers make better logistics decisions during disaster relief.  
The study uses three analytical techniques: embedding, fitting the data to a logistic 
equation, and plotting the limit-cycle.  Embedding and fitting a logistic equation to the 
data were used to test for deterministic chaos.  The logistic equation and two versions of 
the limit-cycle model developed by Priesmeyer, Baik and Cole were also tested as 
potential management tools.   
This study found deterministic chaos was present during the first week of disaster 
relief, but inconclusive results for subsequent weeks possibly due to internal changes to 
the relief dynamics.  The research concludes that the initial conditions and early actions 
will have a significant affect on disaster relief outcome.  Furthermore, many events that 
appear to be uncontrollable and random may actually be controllable.  Therefore, 
managers play a critical role in preparing for and providing guidance in the early stages 
of disaster relief. 
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THE CHAOS OF KATRINA: 
A NONLINEAR ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL LOGISTICS SUPPORT DURING 
HURRICANE KATRINA RELIEF OPERATIONS 
 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
Background 
  
On Thursday, August 25, 2005 a tropical storm in the Caribbean was upgraded to 
hurricane status, which was not unusual since it was the heart of hurricane season.  By 
Friday of the week, the same hurricane, newly named Katrina, was predicted to become a 
category four hurricane and a serious threat to the Gulf Coast from Alabama through 
Louisiana.  The same day, Friday, the governors of Louisiana and Mississippi declared a 
state of Emergency for their respective states.  On Saturday, people in Louisiana and 
Mississippi began evacuations in anticipation of Katrina.  On Sunday, President George 
W. Bush declared Louisiana a federal disaster area. The Superdome was opened as a 
place of refuge on the same day.  On Monday, August 29, 2005 at 6:10 CDT Katrina 
made landfall (Committee, 2006: Ch 5).  This is only the beginning of the disaster that 
has been called the worst natural disaster in modern American history - Hurricane 
Katrina (Townsend, 2006:1). 
Hurricane Katrina affected a huge area.  Over 90,000 square miles were 
devastated and much of the local infrastructure destroyed.  Millions of people had their 
lives thrown into disarray (Carafano, 2006).  Furthermore, although the total number of 
people who died as a result of Katrina may never be known for certain, it has been 
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estimated to be over 1,300 (“Death,” 2006:1).  The economic damage caused by Katrina 
was huge as well.  It has been estimated at $225 billion, which would make it America's 
most expensive disaster (Wolk, 2005).  Out of this estimate, the federal government has 
already allocated over $108 billion to help rebuild the effected infrastructure and provide 
financial aid to survivors (DHS, No Date).  Especially hard hit was New Orleans.  It had 
escaped the initial wrath of Katrina only to be inundated with water as the dikes in New 
Orleans’ levees broke.  Although Katrina devastated the Louisiana and Mississippi gulf 
coast, making the disaster worse to many survivors was the agonizingly slow relief 
caused by poor government logistics performance.  The US Senate report on the disaster, 
“A Nation Still Unprepared,” did not mince words in its critique of the relief effort.  The 
report indicated there was a failure at all government levels to take the threat of possible 
catastrophe as a result of the hurricane season seriously.  Although Katrina had been 
tracked for days prior to landfall, the government failed to take action, and failed 
repeatedly after landfall to provide adequate relief.  The report laid blame on federal, 
state, and local governments for not doing more to help prepare for disaster and to 
quickly respond in the aftermath of Katrina.  Furthermore, the report claimed, “The 
results were tragic loss of life and human suffering on a massive scale, and an 
undermining of confidence in our government’s ability to plan, prepare for, and respond 
to national catastrophes” (Committee, 2006: 2).  This has significant ramifications.  
First, Katrina was not the only catastrophic hurricane that was plagued by poor 
local, state, and federal response; Hurricane Andrew was another (“Disaster 
Management,” 1993).  Poor federal disaster response to Andrew culminated in the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and Department of Defense (DoD) 
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changing their disaster related plans and policies to prevent similar performance in future 
disaster relief operations (Youngbluth, 1996: 1-6).  Nevertheless, lessons learned from 
Andrew were either not applied or were not enough to prevent a repeat of the poor 
performance during Hurricane Katrina.  In addition, the year prior to Katrina a joint 
government exercise, Hurricane Pam, was conducted based on the scenario that a 
category three hurricane makes landfall in New Orleans.  The exercise identified the 
possibility of the levees in New Orleans failing resulting in flooding the city.  It also 
foresaw significant deaths, the need to evacuate between 200,000 and 300,000 people and 
other ominously similar details experienced during Katrina.  Nevertheless, significant 
lessons learned from the exercise were not applied prior to Katrina (Committee, 2006: Ch 
8).   
Second, many Americans considered the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 
to be a watershed event that was supposed to alert all Americans to the possibility of 
other attacks or threats to our way of life.  Katrina serves as a reminder that the United 
States is not as prepared for catastrophe as many people would like to think it is.  
Meteorologists know prior to landfall when a hurricane is approaching and their reports 
allow people a few days to prepare.  This is not the case with most other disasters.  
Hurricane Katrina should not have caught the nation as unprepared as it was (Committee, 
2006: note). 
Finally, statistically Americans can expect to see more frequent severe storms in 
the future.  For years, meteorologists and other scientists have been studying the effects 
of global warming.  Whether it is a natural phenomenon or caused by human activities, 
global warming is having an effect on weather patterns (Position,” 2005; “Global,” 
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2006).  For instance, a study found an 80 percent increase worldwide in Category four 
and five hurricanes, the most severe type.  Also, in the past thirty-five years there has 
been an increase in the total number of hurricanes in the North Atlantic (Webster and 
others, 2005:1844-1846; Kerr, 2005: 1807).  Hurricane Katrina was one such storm.   
Disasters, especially those as catastrophic as Katrina destroy more than homes 
and infrastructure, they destroy lives.  Many people are killed, more are physically 
injured either directly from the disaster or because they are unable to get help for pre-
existing conditions because of the disaster.  Even if spared life and limb, some will still 
suffer from mental anguish and many will carry their emotional scars for life.   
Problem Statement 
 Hurricane Katrina demonstrated that the government was still not prepared to 
manage logistics in the aftermath of a catastrophic disaster, despite after action reports 
from previous disasters, clear storm warnings and several days to prepare prior to 
Katrina’s arrival.  Furthermore, after Katrina made landfall, there was still a lack of 
leadership, communication, and coordination, and resources were often not apportioned 
correctly (Committee, 2006: 2).  Although there were well established plans, logistics 
support during Katrina still performed poorly and appeared to quickly become 
uncontrolled.  The disaster has been the catalyst for many inquiries as to why things went 
wrong in the relief effort and in placing blame on various individuals and organizations.  
Although no one level of government or agency is likely to blame for the poor logistics 
response to Katrina, this research will focus on the federal government’s response.  This 
is due in large part because the federal government has the responsibility of providing 
support to local and state governments.  In short, the federal government is the supplier of 
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resources that cannot be arranged by other means.  Also, contracting data were selected 
as the means of measuring government logistics support.  This is because the federal 
government contracted out much of its logistics support during Katrina (Cooper, 2005: 
Introduction).  Furthermore, information regarding the contracts is readily available to the 
public, thanks to requirements for government oversight and openness (“Katrina 
Contracts,” 2007).   The intent of this research is to provide managers with information 
concerning disaster logistics dynamics, and introduce tools that can identify 
characteristics of this dynamic that may be useful for managers.  For instance, can the 
data shed light into the disaster environment and identify whether a policy change at a 
given point in time will help control events or make them more uncontrollable?  Also, 
can it identify whether there is a pattern in the disaster relief dynamics that was 
overlooked or unrecognized that may indicate how the operation is evolving and how 
managerial decisions affect the disaster outcome? 
Research Objective 
Can an area of complexity science called chaos theory be used to extract useful 
information from the Katrina data that will help managers make better logistics decisions 
during disaster relief?  
Investigative Questions  
 IQ 1:  Does data from Hurricane Katrina exhibit characteristics that can be 
explained by chaos theory?  
IQ 2:  Does this data reveal an underlying pattern that could be useful to 
management for decision making? 
5 
 IQ 3:  Does this data reveal information about the level of control exercised by the 
government in awarding contracts during Katrina? 
 IQ 4:  Can the data be used to estimate the extent or limit of logistics support that 
would eventually be needed? 
Methodology 
This research is a case study of federal logistics support during Hurricane Katrina.  
It consists of a mixed method design, using quantitative data and analysis in the context 
of a qualitative study (Leedy and Ormrod, 2005: 97).  It analyzes the data using pattern 
matching, which is comparing actual or empirical data to a theoretical model (Yin, 
2003:116).  In this case, it compares actual contracting data from Hurricane Katrina to 
chaos theory models.  The unit of analysis is organizational, because it looks at 
contracting data from the federal government as a whole.  
The first step in implementing the methodology is to collect federal contracting 
data from Katrina and prepare this data so that it can be compared to the theoretical 
models.  Next, two of the most often used chaos theory models will be applied to the 
contracting data to evaluate if the data supports the contention that they follow what 
would be expected from chaos theory.  That is to say, does the data contain deterministic 
chaos?  Finally, if the analysis supports a pattern of chaos theory, the data will be 
analyzed to see if it provides information that could be helpful to managers, such as being 
able to use it for diagnostic purposes.  For instance, can the data be used to provide 
feedback to managers allowing them to determine if decisions they have made are having 
a desired effect. 
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Assumptions and limitations 
This study is a case study of Hurricane Katrina.  Therefore, a major limitation to 
this study is that it relies on the events of one disaster.  Hurricane Katrina is a disaster 
that stretched the nation’s ability to cope with the destruction that followed.  It is being 
looked at singularly to test previous findings based on combined data from multiple 
disasters, to see if they also apply to a single disaster.  Another limitation is that this 
research looks only at logistics processes, and not other functions such as security or 
coordinating search and rescue missions.  It also assumes Katrina disaster relief can be 
looked at meaningful as a whole, rather than, or in addition to, being seen as many 
separate, local disasters caused by the same storm.   
Finally, since chaos theory is a paradigm through which to view the disaster, it 
does not eliminate the possibility that other factors were also present.  For instance, if 
chaos theory characteristics are present, it does not mean that poor communication was 
not a factor.  What it does mean is that if future researchers want to evaluate the role of 
communication during Katrina, they should also look at it in nonlinear, chaos terms, 
rather than strictly in linear terms.  For instance, if there is a breakdown in 
communication, in linear terms that means the communication process has been broken 
and obvious information flow has stopped or has been hindered.  Looked at nonlinearly, 
the breakdown in communication begins to affect other areas often unexpectedly so that 
it has a multiplicative effect.   
Implications 
The implication of successfully matching empirical data to chaos theory is that it would 
indicate disaster events follow non-linear, chaotic dynamics.  Initial conditions will have 
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a significant affect on disaster relief outcomes some of which will be unexpected.  It also 
means events that are initially thought to be random processes may actually be 
deterministic, albeit complex system interactions.  Most importantly, it also means events 
that evolve from what appears to be uncontrollable conditions or random events may in 
fact be controllable (Glass, 1996:101).  The decisions managers make before disaster 
strikes and immediately afterwards will have a large impact on the success of the disaster 
relief outcome.
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 II.  Literature Review 
  
 There are several valid explanatory theories as to why the logistic response during 
Katrina was so poor, and more than one may be applicable, and thereby provide at least a 
partial explanation and partial solution to the inefficiencies.  Unfortunately, not all 
explanations are equally enlightening.  In this section, three alternative explanatory 
theories are briefly reviewed, along with a rationale for why they were not chosen as the 
basis of this research. The theory forming the basis of this research, chaos theory, will 
then be discussed with a little more depth, including how it is applicable to disaster 
logistics. 
Communication 
The first explanatory theory to be discussed is communication theory.  
Communication theory may help explain why logistics failed during Katrina, and 
specifically use Katrina as an example of what happens when the communication process 
goes awry.   Communication failure was problematic during Katrina, particularly during 
the first few days after landfall.  Ground and cell phones became inoperable which had a 
huge affect on disaster relief.  But barring this obvious example, there were other 
instances of poor communication.  For example, the United States Senate report, “A 
Nation Still Unprepared,” identifies that there were no plans in place to provide guidance 
on how responders would operate in the event there was no power or the preexisting 
communication infrastructure was inoperable.  In addition, the National Communication 
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System, a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) agency, was unprepared to provide 
communication support to first responders (Committee, 2006:10-16).   
The logistics communication failures that took place during Katrina could also be 
looked at in light of the classic communication process.  The expected benefit from this 
exploration is that by understanding the communication process and why it failed during 
Katrina, steps could be taken to mitigate future communication failures in similar 
disasters.  The result would be improved communication and more effective logistics. 
 Using the communication process to explain why logistics went poorly during 
Katrina has merit, and poor communication has been mentioned in several reports as the 
cause for poor disaster relief.  In the obvious case of the telephone infrastructure 
becoming inoperable, it is easy enough to see that generators powering communications 
equipment were not protected well enough against flooding.  Providing more robust 
protection to backup power sources may be an easy fix in hindsight, if it was merely the 
result of assuming the city’s levees would hold.  Likewise, internet and satellite 
communication proved useful during Katrina disaster relief, therefore, a case might be 
made for expanding these capabilities in disaster-prone areas for better communication 
redundancy.  Other infrastructure problems may exist, such as differing radio frequencies 
and nonstandard nomenclature.  FEMA is addressing this issue with the establishment of 
the National Incident Management System, a standardized plan for disaster response 
(“NIMS,” No Date).  As can be seen, the communication infrastructure problems are 
either being addressed or could be addressed in several different ways.  
In other cases, depending on the level of analysis, the root communication 
problem may be an example of interpersonal or inter-group communication barriers.  For 
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practical applications, rather than theoretical, communication problems might therefore 
be explored as an aspect of a behavioral science, such as psychology or sociology.  A 
holistic perspective of behavioral science will be looked at in a later paragraph, as 
management or organizational behavior.  In either case, it does not appear that exploring 
communication as the root cause for the logistic failure during Katrina would provide 
information that could directly help managers improve their logistics decision making. 
Information Sharing/Supply Chain 
Another explanation for why logistics was poor during Katrina is that there were 
significant problems within the supply chain, and that by improving the supply chain, 
disaster relief could be improved.  Supply chain management is a relatively recent 
business strategy that has expanded the traditional role of logistics in commercial 
businesses.  A supply chain is defined as the life cycle processes supporting physical, 
informational, financial, and knowledge flows for moving products and services from 
suppliers to end users (Ayers, 2004).  The Council of Supply Chain Management 
Professionals defines supply chain in the following way: 
Supply Chain Management encompasses the planning and management of all 
activities involved in sourcing and procurement, conversion, and all Logistics 
Management activities.  Importantly, it also includes coordination and 
collaboration with channel partners, which can be suppliers, intermediates, third-
party service providers, and customers.  In essence, Supply Chain Management 
integrates supply and demand management within and across companies (Vitasek, 
2006). 
 
 Proper attention to supply chain management has led to business efficiencies and 
has emerged as a means of distinguishing leading companies from their competitors.  A 
common example of a company using supply chain management to become an industry 
leader is Wal-Mart.  In his report to congress on lessons learned from Katrina, Dr. 
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Leonard from the Harvard Business School praised Wal-Mart, Lowes, and other supply 
chain giants for the efficient disaster relief they provided in the aftermath of Katrina.  He 
says in the report, “Many modern firms are built around excellence in the management of 
their supply chains, giving them a high degree of precision in knowledge about what they 
have and where it is, together with the capacity to move it efficiently to where it needs to 
be delivered” (Leonard, 2006).  Supply chain management is a strategy that has been 
shown necessary for logistic success even in disaster relief.   
Besides the faulty logic of comparing the supply chains of Wal-Mart, a for-profit 
enterprise, with a continuing business interest, with the governmental disaster task force 
set up specifically to provide disaster aid, exploring Katrina as an example of poor supply 
chain management is still problematic.  Supply chain management relies on information 
sharing.  Companies have control over internal supply chain information and share this 
information with supply chain partners for their mutual benefit.  Unfortunately, based on 
government reports, FEMA did not have adequate control of its supply chain information 
during Katrina.  For instance, it was unable to maintain visibility of assets after initial 
deployment or requisition.  This results in two major difficulties for researchers.  The first 
is the obvious need to remedy the lack of asset visibility.  This has been identified as an 
area of improvement for FEMA, which is already working to resolve the problem (DHS, 
2005).  The second problem is the lack of empirical data necessary for modeling and 
comparing solutions.  Consequentially, while looking at Katrina from a supply chain 
perspective also has merit, it would be difficult to study with the available data.   
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Management/Organizational Behavior  
A third explanatory theory for exploring why logistics failed during Katrina is 
Organizational Behavior.  Organizational Behavior is a combination of several behavioral 
sciences used to derive multidisciplinary and often practical insight helpful to managers.  
It can be used to help explain why an organization, or individuals within an organization 
behave in the matter they do, and more importantly, what changes should be made to the 
organization so that desired behavior is more likely (Gibson and all, 2006:6-9).  This line 
of exploration could lead to many insightful findings about what may have contributed to 
logistics failure during Hurricane Katrina.   
For example, one type of organizational culture is termed Bureaucratic Culture.  
A bureaucratic culture is one that relies on formal control and is focused on internal 
processes, organizations that typify this culture include military and government agencies 
(Gibson and all, 2006:37-38).  This culture may have had an effect on government 
disaster relief during Katrina.  For instance, DHS including FEMA as well as DoD 
appeared hampered by several layers of authority.  Both FEMA and DHS were frustrated 
by the amount of time it took for DoD to take action on requests for assistance.  Even the 
White House found the process overly formal and slow, and described the process as the 
“21-step” approval process (Committee, 2006: Ch 26, 19).  It was also frustrating from 
the military perspective; many units were already preparing to assist with the disaster 
relief prior to and immediately after landfall of Katrina and were surprised at the lack of 
requests for assistance received in the first few days (Committee, 2006: Ch 26, 25).   
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Other areas of Organizational Behavior could be explored such as the role 
individuals, especially leaders, played in logistics during Katrina.  It could also explore 
the extent that intergroup behavior and conflict played in Katrina relief logistics. 
Organizational Behavior explanations for the failed logistics during Katrina relief 
hold promise for many areas of research at all levels of analysis.  However the majority 
of the research inquiries in this area require an intimate knowledge of either individuals 
or organizations involved in Katrina relief operations.   
Chaos Theory 
The final explanatory model and the one selected for this study is chaos theory.  
Chaos theory is part of a larger body of knowledge known as Complexity Science.  At its 
heart is the idea that what initially looks like random events may actually be part of a 
very complex pattern that is practically unpredictable, but that has as its source 
nonrandom events.  This section will provide a brief background into chaos theory, 
provide some characteristics of deterministic chaos systems, and discuss general 
applications.  It will then briefly describe some specific applications pertinent to this 
research.  Specifically, it will review the application of chaos theory to management, 
supply chain management and disaster management. 
Background. 
Chaos theory was first hinted at by Henri Poincaré in 1903 in his essay, “Science 
and Method.”  The King of Sweden had sponsored a contest to provide proof that the 
solar system, as modeled by Newtonian physics, was dynamically stable.  Unfortunately, 
Poincaré was unable to find a complete solution, but as a result of his tremendous work 
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was awarded the prize anyway.  In his essay, he noted, “small differences in the initial 
conditions produce very great ones in the final phenomena” (“Henri,” No Date).   
This phenomenon was also experienced by Edward Lorenz, a meteorologist at 
MIT.   He was working on a computer weather simulation and decided that instead of 
restarting a long sequence, he would save time by reentering data from an earlier run of 
the sequence at a midway point.  However, after about an hour into the new run, Lorenz 
noticed that the computer had created an entirely new and completely different weather 
pattern from what he had expected.  After some investigation, it turned out the data 
created the new weather pattern because of rounding.  The computer held six decimal 
places, but the data reentered only went to three decimal places.  The 0.000127 that was 
left off the reentered data was enough to create an entirely different weather pattern in the 
computer simulation.  Lorenz wrote a paper on this phenomenon, which popularized the 
effect and thereafter it has been known as the “Butterfly Effect” (“What is Chaos,” No 
date). 
As a result of Lorenz and Poincaré, scientists and researchers became interested in 
this and related phenomenon and their research gave rise to chaos theory.  Chaos theory 
defines chaos as data that is non-linear and too complex to use for predicting data points, 
but has limits and is deterministic.  Further research also gave rise to related phenomena 
such as Complex Adaptive Systems.  These phenomena are generally grouped together as 
Complexity Theory/Science (Singh and Singh, 2002:23). 
Characteristics. 
According to chaos theory, deterministic chaos systems can be classified into two 
primary behaviors, stable and chaotic.  The area between them is often referred to as the 
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“edge of chaos” (Rosenhead, 1998).  A stable system is one in which the behavior tends 
toward a particular outcome, even when disturbed, it will return to this initial outcome.  
That is to say, its outcome is the same as if it would have been had it not been disturbed.  
A chaotic system however is one which is sensitive to even small disturbances.  A small 
disturbance to a chaotic system will result in a different outcome than it would have been 
had it not been disturbed.  As one would expect, systems at the edge of chaos are flexible, 
that is to say, they are easier to change than a stable system, but are not as sensitive as 
chaotic systems.  In applying chaos theory to management, it is systems at the edge of 
chaos that are interesting to most researchers.   
Systems of deterministic chaos display the following characteristics: Sensitive to 
initial conditions, time irreversibility, attractors, fractional forms/geometry and 
bifurcation.   The first characteristic, being sensitive to initial conditions, is the one 
discovered by Poincaré and Lorenz.  It is summed up well by the description of how 
Lorenz came upon the phenomenon.  This characteristic is also what makes chaos theory 
non-linear.  The next characteristic is time irreversibility.  Systems displaying chaos are 
so complex, that the initial conditions often can never be repeated, only nearly so.  This is 
especially true when looking at natural systems.  Attractors are another characteristic.  
Attractors are the conditions that the system gravitates towards.  In a stable system there 
is one attractor.  “Edge of chaos” systems have two to eight attractors and in chaotic 
systems many attractors.  Some are called strange attractors if they lead to an unexpected 
result.  Attractors can be a single point or a collection of points, such as an orbit (“What 
is Chaos,” No date).  Figure 1, below, illustrates a two-attractor system.  The system can 
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be seen to oscillate over time, settling quickly to two y-values.  They are approximately 
5.6 and 7.7. 
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Figure 1.  Illustration of two-attractor system 
 
Fractional forms also called fractional geometry are a visual characteristic of 
some deterministic chaos systems.  It is a phenomenon in which any section of a curve or 
surface appears the same when compared to a magnification of the same image.  The 
Koch Curve is an example of fractional geometry (Clayton, 1997).  This is illustrated 
below in figure 2.  It can be seen that level two in the figure is merely a reproduction of 
the same triangle pattern as the generator level at one-third scale and evenly spaced on 
the surfaces.  This replication rule, continues through level three and higher levels. 
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Figure 2.  Koch Curve (Clayton, 1997) 
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 Another characteristic of deterministic chaos systems and the last to be discussed 
is bifurcations.  Bifurcations are points where the system becomes so disturbed that the 
current number of attractors cannot continue to contain the solutions or behavior, so that 
it causes the number of solutions or attractors to double.  For instance, if a stable one-
solution system becomes disturbed too much it will mutate into a two-solution system.  If 
the disturbance continues it might bifurcate into a four-solution system.  The logistic map 
below, in figure 3, illustrates the possible solutions to a system.  With low parameter 
values, expressed as r in the diagram, one solution is possible.  As the value of r increases 
to approximately r = 3, the number of possible solutions bifurcates into two solutions.  
This process continues to bifurcate until after r = 3.57, when the system cascades into an 
indefinitely large number of bifurcations. 
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Figure 3.  Bifurcation points on Logistic map (“Bifurcation,” 2006) 
   
 
Applications. 
 Chaos theory was first used by mathematicians and physicists to help them 
understand turbulence such as found in weather patterns and smoke fumes (“What is 
Chaos,” No Date).  It later spread to other sciences as varied as biology, ecology, medical 
research, psychology, economics, finance, and others (“Chaos and Complexity,” 2006).  
This research is analyzing the use of chaos theory to help managers in logistics provide 
more efficient disaster relief.  Therefore, applications important to this research are 
management and specifically supply chain management and disaster management. 
 As mentioned above, chaos theory in its early application tended to be technical 
and used mathematical models as the basis of research.  However, some researchers have 
since applied the theory to situations in which data could not be quantitatively captured.  
In the literature this is often referred to as a metaphorical use of chaos theory 
(Clayton,1997).  Although using chaos theory metaphorically can be helpful in 
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developing models or creating new paradigms to help understand complex situations, it 
tends to be more subjective than quantitative applications.   
Chaos theory when applied to management and decision making usually takes one 
of two forms.  The first is to provide insight into management strategies that are more 
effective than traditional means, given deterministic chaos is in the system.  The other is 
how managers can use information from businesses to control companies in edge of 
chaos environments.  Most management applications of chaos theory are as metaphorical 
models.  In a metaphorical model, the researcher will analyze a managerial environment 
or condition and described it in terms of characteristics of chaos theory, even though the 
condition cannot be measured.  For instance, if the condition can be described as being 
sensitive to change and having the potential for unpredictable results, the researcher 
would infer that deterministic chaos is present.  Furthermore, if deterministic chaos is 
present, it infers that what is true for chaos theory systems may be true of the managerial 
condition.  
The first study suggests that chaos theory is an appropriate model to analyze 
management, because the reality of organizations and their environments have changed 
while assumptions about them have not.  For instance, three assumptions typically made 
about companies are that they are closed systems, the environment is stable, and there are 
clear management actions that have clear and predictable results.  The reality, according 
to Glass is different.  In his study, he suggests that all organizations are complex and 
affected by their environment, the organizations’ environment is rapidly changing, and 
cause and effect relationships are not always clear (Glass, 1996).   
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An example provided in his study is that given a traditional, linear view of 
business, an increase in advertising expenditures results in increased sales (within the 
laws of diminishing returns).  However, in reality an increase in advertising might push a 
competitor to develop a more effective advertising campaign that results in the original 
company experiencing lower sales than the original condition.  Glass refers to this 
phenomenon as a vicious cycle, which he explains is a system spiraling toward negative, 
often unexpected outcomes.  A virtuous cycle on the other hand is when the phenomenon 
results in the system spiraling toward positive outcomes (Glass, 1996).   
As a result of his research, Glass finds that managers should acknowledge the 
inherently nonlinear condition of management and organizational dynamics and make 
adjustments to their management style.  For instance, managers should move away from 
trying to stabilize their present condition, such as maintaining a certain percentage of 
market share, and instead focus their attention on the rapid shifts in their environment 
which might become amplified, that is become opportunities they can seize.  Another 
management change is more flexibility in direction.  For example, rather than initiating a 
detailed top-down strategy, managers should provide clear organizational goals.  
Management should also cultivate a learning environment with empowered employees to 
improve its likelihood of seizing opportunities as they arise (Glass, 1996).   Glass’s 
conclusions are similar to that of other researchers into chaos theory applications in 
management (Young and Kiel, 1994; Singh and Singh, 2002:23).  
Another study shows that chaos theory goes against the traditional view of 
management, which is to provide formal control in a stable environment.  Instead, as with 
Glass, Young and Kiel suggest that decentralized control and a quick, responsive 
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workforce is in more harmony with chaos theory ideals.  Young and Kiel summarizes the 
role of the manager this way, “The task of the postmodern manager is to expedite 
bifurcations which produce desirable attractors and, at the same time, to control key 
parameters to stabilize such outcome states for a firm while framing organizational policy 
in such a way as to not destabilize the larger political economy” (Young and Kiel, 1994). 
Another study provides a critique of applying complexity theory to management.  
It discusses whether complexity science should be applied to management and if so, its 
limitations.  In his study, Rosenhead finds that management topics, unlike hard sciences, 
cannot be proven.  Management concepts are either empirically supported or not.  
Furthermore, much of the quantitative research is based on computer simulations which 
are then analyzed to see how well they mimic empirical observations, rather than being 
based on the empirical observations themselves.  So Rosenhead claims that while 
research applying complexity science to management assumes universal applicability of 
the results, they are open to debate on how representative they really are.  Rosenhead also 
makes a distinction between the metaphorical use of complexity science, and its use as an 
analogy.  For instance, he gives the example of using an automobile as a metaphor for the 
economy by using terms such as, “applying the brakes” or “a touch on the accelerator,” to 
describe actions affecting the economy.   He doubts anyone using a metaphor in this way 
would use it as the basis to change to the system.  It just makes the underlying concept 
being analyzed clearer (Rosenhead, 1998).  As an analogy however, complexity science 
might be more useful than a metaphor.  Many important scientific breakthroughs have 
been the result of using a known phenomenon as a predictive model to analyze a new 
one.  Unfortunately, Rosenhead concludes that complexity science does not meet key 
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criteria that are needed to use it as an analogy for management.  Among the needed 
criteria is that complexity science should be more understood than management theory 
and that there should be precise similarities between the two phenomena.  Rosenhead 
does however provide hope that this inapplicability is not a permanent condition.  He 
writes, “This situation could well change, as complexity theory develops further, or as 
management complexity writers refine their analysis.  However, at present the conceptual 
basis seems inadequate to support testable analogical insights” (Rosenhead, 1998).  
 Chaos theory has also been specifically applied to supply chain management.  For 
the most part, this research has been in two areas.  First, it has been applied to the 
amplification of errors within a supply chain, a phenomenon that has been termed the 
“bullwhip effect.”  It has also been applied to the phenomenon in complexity science in 
which systems develop order out of disorder.  This is referred to as self-organization 
(Wilding, 2006; Choi and others, 2001: 351).  The case of error amplification is more 
applicable to this study.  It is an example of a system that is sensitive to initial conditions, 
not unlike the findings of Poincaré and Lorenz.   
In the first example, Wilding addresses a problem that could arise as a result of 
managers attempting to keep their supply inventories levels too low.  In his study, 
Wilding used an automated smoothing technique to control inventory levels; a common 
means companies use to control their supply levels.  The algorithm resulted in using old 
forecast data for making new forecasts, which caused errors to be amplified.  The result 
was chaos or instability being introduced into the system.  Wilding writes, “a system that 
is meant to control fluctuations, and consequently buffer the system from instability, can 
create dynamics that turn a stable demand pattern into one that is unpredictable with 
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occasional explosive changes in demand” (Wilding, 2006: 5).  Wilding reports in his 
research that it is corroborated by the inventory management study of John Sterman from 
MIT.  Sterman found that when policies to lower inventories are introduced, costs could 
increase by as much as 500 percent higher than optimum as a result of stock outages and 
erratic ordering (Wilding, 2006).      
 The phenomenon of error amplification has also been studied by other 
researchers.  For instance, Laugesen and Mosekilde analyzed this phenomenon in the 
BEER Game.  The BEER game is a management game developed at the Sloan School of 
Management.  The game is played by individuals or teams who assume the role of a 
particular link in the supply chain, such as producer, wholesaler, or distributor.  The retail 
player orders “beer” from the wholesaler, based on customer demand.  The wholesaler 
then orders beer from the distributor, and this process continues up through the supply 
chain to the producer.  Each link has a built in delay, which causes demand amplification 
or the bullwhip effect that characterizes the game.  In their study, computer simulations 
of the BEER game were made and the results examined.  Laugesen and Mosekilde found 
interesting forms of bifurcations, and other elements characteristic of deterministic chaos 
systems in their simulations.  In the conclusion of their study, Laugesen and Mosekilde 
report similarities between their simulations and actual economic dynamics.  They 
believe the oscillations in the systems they studied, significantly contribute to the 
formation of business cycles (Laugesen and Mosekilde, 2006).  
 Chaos theory has also been applied to disasters and crisis.  These studies have 
looked at chaos both metaphorically and quantitatively.  For instance, in the first study 
chaos theory is applied metaphorically to public relations during disasters.  One of the 
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points Murphy makes in her study is that an organization may be able to influence 
disaster events up to a point, after which it becomes uncontrollable.  She writes, “chaos 
theory stress that these cataclysmic moments are not random, but rather the culmination 
of accumulated ‘noise’ within the system itself.  Put another way, certain organizations 
contain flaws within themselves that amplify over time to self-generate crisis independent 
of outside factors” (Murphy, 1996: 106).  Murphy suggests that it may be possible to 
control change, by influencing the system prior to the point when the system enters 
chaos.  That is to say, to influence the system while it is still at the edge of chaos.  Using 
the example of the Exxon Valdez oil spill off the coast of Alaska, Murphy explains that 
Exxon was criticized for not taking control of the oil spill, quickly and missing the 
opportunity for creating a positive public opinion.  This is contrasted to the actions of 
Johnson & Johnson.  After the Tylenol tampering scare, Johnson & Johnson’s quick 
action led to a positive public outcome rather than the negative one as with Exxon.  
Murphy also points out the affects of strange attractors.  Using rumors as an example, she 
points out, “Organizations often try to combat rumors with facts.  However, if rumors are 
indeed chaotic systems, facts will have little permanent effect against the underlying 
cultural anxieties that govern response to a given product, company, or technology” 
(Murphy, 1996: 107).  In other words, the rumor is a reflection of the dominant cultural 
attitude.  It is the attractor or point of stability and can only be changed when there is a 
bifurcation of the cultural attitude.  
 Another study used a quantitative approach to apply chaos theory to disaster 
management.  This research was presented at a conference in May 1995, entitled, “What 
Disaster Response Management Can Learn from Chaos Theory.”  Two researchers, 
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Priesmeyer and Cole, presented a paper in which they use a logistic regression model to 
analyze a data set of 257 respondents in 106 different disaster events.  The equation used 
in the model is the logistic equation which is also known as the predator-prey equation.  
The equation contains one variable, referred to as X in Priesmeyer and Cole’s study and 
one parameter, k.  The logistic equation is then fitted to the empirical data at various k- 
and X-values to find the best values to fit the data.  Comparing the empirical data to the 
theoretical model resulted in an F-value of 6.75, which was significant at the 95 percent 
confidence level.  Their research resulted in a k-value of 3.66 during the first 24-hours, 
which is near 3.7; the number they report as the threshold of chaos in their model.  They 
interpret the value of k to indicate the level of stability in the environment.  Priesmeyer 
and Cole concluded that their results provide quantitative evidence that disaster response 
is nonlinear and has characteristic of deterministic chaos.  They report the k value of 3.66 
is an ideal level, because it indicates that disaster response was flexible but not chaotic.  
Their conclusion is, “chaos which results during these first 24 hours is a necessary and 
desirable condition which accommodates adaptation, cross-communication, the 
suspension of rules or policies, and other emergent behavior essential to an efficient 
response” (Priesmeyer and Cole, 1996).   
In the same paper, Priesmeyer and Cole provide a management tool to evaluate 
the evolution of disaster response by analyzing the change of two closely related 
resources over time.  Their study used the need for Emergency Medical System (EMS) 
personnel and equipment and firefighting personnel/equipment as the two related 
resources.  The change in resources is plotted on a Cartesian plane, and analyzed as to 
whether there is an increase or decrease in the change in demand of each resource.  The 
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quadrant in which the change is plotted determines the direction of growth of the disaster 
response (Priesmeyer and Cole, 1996).     
 The same May 1995 conference also provided information on how social time 
impacts chaos theory and self-organization.  Social time is the concept that the 
responders’ perception of time, and not just the time that has actually elapsed, has 
significance.  The conclusion of the attendees at the conference is that managers could 
learn several things from chaos theory.  For instance, they learn that disaster response 
should be flexible and adaptive.  Other lessons are that managers should look for 
fluctuations which might indicate bifurcation points, managers should be catalysts of 
change deliberately causing bifurcations, and disaster infrastructure should be flexible 
enough to allow response to self-organize (Koehler, 1996). 
 Limitations. 
 Although chaos theory provides insight into disaster relief, it has limitations as 
well.  First, as with any model, it is an approximation of reality and not the reality itself.  
There are likely other models that could provide insight into a different aspect of disaster 
relief.  It is unlikely that any one model will be able to explain every aspect of reality.  A 
second limitation is not every organization that provides disaster relief is affected by the 
disaster in the same way.  Some organizations may be heavily stressed, while others play 
periphery roles (Koehler, 1996).  Finally, disasters are naturally complex.  Consequently, 
other problems may exist.  For instance, if inter-organizational conflict is present, it may 
or may not represent a condition that leads to instability, but chaos theory does not 
address the root cause of the conflict. 
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The quantitative examples provided by Priesmeyer and Cole presented at the May 
1995 conference were based on data from several disasters combined together rather than 
looking at them one at a time, unlike the present study.  Comparing chaos theory models 
to federal contracting data during Katrina should provide insight into the logistics failures 
during Katrina.  The comparison should be able to discriminate between whether the 
failure was due to random events, or instead by poor management decisions.  If the later 
is the case, then it may be possible to control events through changes made by 
knowledgeable managers.   
 There are other valid theories to explain why the logistic response during Katrina 
was so poor.  Furthermore, these theories may provide at least a partial explanation and 
solution to logistics inefficiencies.  However, not all explanations are equally 
enlightening.  This section provided background into three alternative explanatory 
theories with a rationale for why they were not chosen as the basis for this research.  It 
also provided a description of chaos theory, the model chosen for this study.   
 
 
28 
III.  Methodology 
Overview 
 
The objective of this study is to answer the research question: Can an area of 
complexity science called chaos theory be used to extract useful information from the 
Katrina contracting data that will help managers make better logistics decisions during 
disaster relief?  The methodology chosen for this research is a case study. Yin mentions 
that a case study is an appropriate research methodology for explanatory studies, when 
researchers want to answer questions relating to “how” or “why” and do not require 
control of behavioral events.  Furthermore, he provides an example of when this 
approach is appropriate, “Thus if you wanted to know how a community successfully 
overcame the negative impact . . . you would be less likely to rely on a survey or an 
examination of archival records and might be better off doing a history or case study” 
(Yin, 2003:6).  This study analyzes whether chaos theory is useful in “explaining” the 
poor logistics support during Hurricane Katrina and might also provide useful insights for 
managers making logistics decisions.  Just as Priesmeyer and Cole’s research found the 
presence of deterministic chaos in general disaster relief, this study should provide 
insight into whether there is evidence of deterministic chaos in a specific catastrophic 
disaster, Hurricane Katrina.  If deterministic chaos is present, it would indicate that initial 
conditions of disaster response would have a significant affect on the relief’s outcome, 
and furthermore some of the events which are thought to be random or evolve from 
uncontrollable earlier events may actually be controllable.  If this is the case, then the 
success or failure of logistics support during disaster relief operations relies in large part 
29 
on the decisions logistics managers make prior to, and during the initial onset of the 
disaster. 
This study relies on a mixed method design.  A mixed method design combines 
quantitative and qualitative components in research (Leedy and Ormrod, 2005: 97).  In 
this study, quantitative data was obtained on the federal contracts awarded in support of 
Hurricane Katrina.  This data will be analyzed using pattern matching, which is 
comparing actual or empirical data to a theoretical model (Yin, 2003:116).  The 
theoretical model in this case is chaos theory.  The case study design and questions, 
however, are qualitative in nature.  The quantitative results of the research will be used to 
answer qualitative questions, and therefore, the mixed method design of this study.   
Federal contracts related to Katrina were chosen as the source data for two 
reasons.  First, it appears an appropriate means of quantifying federal logistics activity.  
Federal agencies rely on contracting to bridge the gap between what is needed from the 
agency and what they are able to provide with internal resources.  This is especially true 
in the case for logistics commodities and services.  According to David Cooper, Director, 
Acquisition and Sourcing Manger in the Government Accountability Office (GAO), 
federal agencies are increasing the trend of contracting out work.  Federal agencies 
responding to Katrina provides a case in point.  Cooper reports, “The government’s 
response to Katrina and Rita, for example, depended heavily on contractors to deliver ice, 
water, and food supplies as well as the effort to patch rooftops and supply temporary 
housing to displaced residents and evacuees” (Cooper, 2005: Introduction).  The second 
reason is that the data is readily available.  The contracting data from Katrina are 
available from the Federal Procurement Data System-New Generation (FPDS-NG).  
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These data are also publicly assessable, which increases the ability for other researchers 
to replicate or verify the study (“Katrina Contracts,” 2007).  Since, the contracting data is 
federal government-wide, the unit of analysis for this study is organizational.  
Data 
Although the contracting data from the FPDS-NG is publicly assessable, it comes 
with a disclaimer, “Many contracting offices supporting Katrina, particularly those 
relocated to the disaster recovery area, do not have access to their normal contract writing 
systems and thus have not been able to populate FPDS-NG contemporaneously with the 
contract awards they have made.  Others have not had time to enter data due to the tempo 
of operations. It is impossible to estimate the impact this may have on the total numbers” 
(“Katrina Contracts,” 2007).  The data used in this study was current as of 4 January 2007 
and is assumed to have the majority of the contracts awarded during Katrina, albeit this is 
a limitation of the data. The full database contains 13,907 contracts awarded by 22 
departments, some representing several federal agencies.  Out of this database, only 
contracts effective between 28 August and 5 November 2005 are used.  The narrowed 
database covers the first ten weeks of relief effort, beginning 28 August.  This date was 
chosen, because it was the last day that had zero contracts awarded prior to the main 
Katrina relief effort.  All the dates in the study contained data with values greater than 
zero. The narrowed database used in this study contains 5,544 contracts.    
The contracting data used in the study are both the number of contracts which 
became effective on a given day and the total dollar value of the contracts that became 
effective on that day.  These values became the measures of interest in this study.  A 
preliminary study was also conducted using the contracting pay categories, or value 
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bands.  The use of value bands as a means of analyzing the data will be discussed further 
in Chapter 4, Results and Analysis. 
After the data were collected, they needed to be prepared for analysis.  Scale was 
a concern when using the number-of-contracts and contract-values data in the same 
equation.  It also became a concern when using the logistic equation which requires data 
values between zero and one.   So, a means to normalize the data needed to be found.  
The typical method of normalizing data used in the logistic equation, when it is used to 
estimate populations, is to calculate it as the percent of the maximum possible population 
for each point in the time series.  So for instance, if the maximum population for a 
particular environment is one million, and the value at a given point in time is 500,000, 
then the data would be measured as 0.50 or 50%.  Since the maximum number of 
contracts and the maximum available funds for contracts on a given day is not known, 
another means of normalizing the empirical data needed to be found.   
The solution chosen was to measure each day’s value as a percent.  The total 
activity for all seven weeks and weekly totals were both used as denominators in 
calculating percents.  The percentage was calculated differently depending on the system 
being modeled.   For instance, in the case of analyzing a ten-week system all 70 days of 
the data points were used to determine the daily value.  Each day was a percent of the 
total amount for all 70 days, this can written as:   
70    
Pi = xi/∑xi      (1) 
                 i=1      
Were Pi is the percent at a given (i) day, and x is the value at a given (i) day. 
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For the one-week system models, the percent was calculated using weekly totals 
to calculate daily values.  This method can be described as:    
7    
Pi = xi/∑xi      (2) 
                  i=1  
 
  As with the previous formula, Pi is the percent at a given (i) day, and x is the value at a 
given (i) day.    
The data generated by the logistic equation was similarly normalized by 
calculating it as a percent using the same method as with the empirical data.  So for 
instance, if the empirical data is measured as the percent of the total for the week, the 
data generated by the logistic equation was likewise measured as a percent of the total for 
the week.  This allows a comparison of the chaos model with the empirical data using the 
same scale.   
There is a rationale for measuring the disaster relief time series both as ten-week 
systems and as one-week systems.  As dynamic as logistic support is during disaster 
relief, the system is likely being adjusted and continually changed.  To illustrate, consider 
contracting agents.  They award contracts based on particular needs and then will 
evaluate whether the contracting activity was able to meet those needs.  Further 
contracting activity will then attempt to either readdress needs not initially met, or meet 
new needs.  Each time this redirection takes place, it changes the system. The 
significance of this is that the system may be continually changing and it may not be 
possible to describe the whole ten-week system with one parameter.  Because of this, the 
data for the first ten weeks will be looked at both as ten-week systems and as one-week 
systems.   
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The reason one-week systems were chosen is because there is a compromise in 
trying to capture the dynamics of a continuously changing system and having enough 
data points to make a comparison.  Considering it is common to look at our personal and 
professional lives in terms of days, weeks, and months; taking a slice of the time series at 
weekly intervals seems a natural choice.  Looking at the data by week might be 
exemplified by managers who use weekly staff meetings for feedback to make 
adjustments in their decisions and policies.  In this study, the week runs from Sunday to 
Saturday.   
  Investigative Questions  
 To meet the objective of this research and guide the study, investigative questions 
were developed.  These questions are: 
 IQ 1:  Does federal contracting data from Hurricane Katrina exhibit 
characteristics that can be explained by chaos theory?  
IQ 2:  Does this data reveal an underlying pattern that could be useful to 
management for decision making? 
 IQ 3:  Does this data reveal information about the level of control exercised by the 
federal government in awarding contracts during Katrina? 
 IQ 4:  Can the data be used to estimate the extent or limit of logistics support that 
would eventually be needed during disaster relief? 
Answering investigative questions 
 The investigative questions will not be present in numerical order.  Investigative 
question three provides detail on the characteristics and dynamics of the logistic equation, 
which is used to generate the data for the theoretical model in the embedding process.  
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The embedding process is used to answer investigative question one.  Therefore, 
investigative question three will be addressed first, which will allow the basics of the 
logistic equation to be explained and allow readers a better understanding of the 
principles being used in later applications of the equation. 
Investigative Question 3. 
Does this data reveal information about the level of control exercised by federal 
agencies in awarding contracts during Katrina? 
The logistic equation was chosen to analyze the amount of control in the system, 
because it is one of many models that can be used for this purpose.  In addition, 
Priesmeyer and Cole used it specifically with disaster response to verify that the data 
reflected, what they would consider, an appropriate level of stability/control during the 
first twenty-four hours of disaster relief (Priesmeyer and Cole, 1996).  The logistic 
equation was initially used to describe population growth, but has since been applied to 
other phenomenon such as in economics and organizational science (Zimm, 2005).  The 
logistic equation contains a parameter that quantifies the amount of stability in the 
environment, in this study it will be identified by the symbol lambda, “λ.” At lower 
parameters the logistic equation data exhibits stability, as the parameter increases so does 
the sensitivity of the system to change.  If deterministic chaos is present in a natural or 
empirical system, it is expected that when it is compared to the logistic equation, the 
parameter-λ would reflect a value that equates to the amount of stability in the system.  
The logistic equation cascades into chaos, at parameter values above 3.57, and would 
indicate a lack of control in the system being analyzed.  Systems under 3.57 indicate 
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stable or edge of chaos conditions which is indicative of controlled systems (Priesmeyer 
and Cole, 1996; Harrison, 2006; Clayton, 1997).     
The logistic equation is expressed as: 
Xn+1 = λXn(1-Xn)    (3) 
In the equation Xn+1 represents the value of the next point in the time series, Xn is the 
value of the current point in the time series, 1-Xn is a suppression element and λ is the 
control parameter.  As originally used to describe the population growth, the population 
of the next generation is represented by Xn+1, the current population is represented Xn,  
and 1-Xn  takes into account the effects of overfeeding, overcrowding, deaths, and so 
forth.  The population growth is represented by the λ-parameter.  The range of values for 
X in the logistic equation is between 0 and 1, and is a measure of the percent of the 
maximum population the environment can support.  The range of values for λ is between 
0 and 4.  The reason the equation is closely associated with chaos theory is the interesting 
variation in results mentioned above that occur with different λ-parameter values.  With a 
parameter value less than one, the population will stabilize at zero.  That is to say, the 
population is not sustainable and dies out.  At parameter values between 1 and 3 the 
population will stabilize to one attractor.  Values larger than 3 begin to bifurcate first 
oscillating between two points, then four, then eight, until at a parameter value of 3.57 
after which the number of bifurcations begins to oscillate between so many attractor 
points that it becomes chaotic (Priesmeyer and Cole, 1996; Harrison, 2006; Clayton, 
1997).   
In their application of the logistic equation, Priesmeyer and Cole used the amount 
of responder activity during a particular time frame, probably one hour, as X.  (The actual 
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measure of time was unclear in the literature.)  The time series was plotted for the first 
twenty-four hours and fitted to a logistic equation to determine the best X-variable and λ-
parameter.  Their study found a statistically significant similarity between the empirical 
disaster response data and the logistic equation.  The parameter was interpreted as the 
amount of amount of stability within the disaster environment.  Priesmeyer and Cole’s 
model provides a basis of what to expect in disaster relief in general.  If, however, the 
model is used for short slices of a time series, it allows managers to understand how 
stable the system is initially and how their decisions might affect the disaster response.  
More importantly, managers can make adjustments at the end of each time series slice 
using the logistic equation as a feedback source on the measure of stability and affect 
activity during subsequent time periods.  For instance, if managers realize the 
environment is near chaos, they could avoid initiating policies which might increase the 
instability.  If Katrina data is found to exhibit λ-parameter values under 3.57, it would 
indicate a stable system or one near the edge of chaos and therefore managers were in 
control of the system. Values over 3.57 would indicate a loss of control.  This would 
indicate an inability for managers to initially cope with the disaster. 
 Investigative Question 1.   
Does federal contracting data from Hurricane Katrina exhibit characteristics that 
can be explained by chaos theory?   
Embedding is an appropriate means of analyzing data from Katrina to see if it 
contains evidence of deterministic chaos (James, 1996:44).  Embedding was selected 
because it is a simple process, yet effective in revealing deterministic chaos.  It uses a 
single time series to represent more than one dimension in the plot of a dynamic system.   
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The process consists of taking two consecutive points in a time series, to create a vector, 
then plotting them on a Cartesian plane.  The number of points in the time series used to 
determine one data point on the plot defines the number of dimensions that will be 
plotted.  For instance, given a time series of a, b, c, d, and e; three dimensions could be 
plotted by assigning x-, y-, and z-coordinates as illustrated below in table 1 (James, 
1996:44: Clayton, 1997; Shockley, 2005: 150): 
 
 
Table 1.  Assigning values to x, y, and z for 3-diminsional embedding 
 
Plot data point x-coordinate y-coordinate z-coordinate 
1 a b c 
2 b c d 
3 c d e 
 
Examples of time series known to exhibit deterministic chaos and known to be 
random are provided below to illustrate the differences in the dynamics of two types of 
systems.  The logistic equation was used to generate data that characterizes deterministic 
chaos.   
In the first plot, data was generated by the logistic equation using X = 0.5 and λ = 
2.9 and is illustrated below in figure 4.  The λ-parameter = 2.9 describes a system with a 
one-point attractor, it can be seen in figure 4 that the data oscillates before it quickly 
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settles down to its stability point, or attractor.  This movement is similar to a pendulum 
coming to rest after being disturbed.   
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Figure 4.  Time series of logistic equation, X = 0.5, λ = 2.9 
 
The same data plotted in figure 4, is embedded in three dimensions in the plot illustrated 
in figure 5.  Note that the line created by the data becomes denser toward the center.  This 
is where the system stabilizes to its attractor.  
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Figure 5.  Three-dimensional plot of embedded time series, X = 0.5, λ = 2.9 
 
 A time series for a logistic equation using X = 0.5 and λ = 3.7 is illustrated below 
in figure 6.  The λ-parameter is at the level where the system has become chaotic. The 
plot of the system in figure 6 shows some pattern initially but quickly dissipates over 
time and is lost.    
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Figure 6.  Time series of logistic equation, X = 0.5, λ = 3.7 
 
 
When the same data used in figure 6 is embedded in three dimensions and plotted a 
pattern is seen.  It appears to be an “S” shape, or curve.  This can be seen in figure 7, 
below.   
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Figure 7.  Three-dimensional plot of embedded time series, X = 0.5, λ = 3.7 
 
 
Even a time series with a λ-parameter level near the upper limit of possible outcomes, X 
= 0.5 and λ = 3.99, shows a pattern when embedded.  A plot of the time series appears in 
figure 8.  There is less of a pattern apparent in this plot, than of the one in figure 6, but a 
careful look reveals some oscillation in the beginning before it becomes chaotic.   
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Figure 8.  Time series of logistic equation, X = 0.5, λ = 3.99 
 
The embedded time series of the same data used to create the plot in figure 8 is illustrated 
in figure 9.  The three-dimensional pattern in the embedded plot appears to form a 
continuation of the shape in figure 7.  It looks as if the curve loops back around forming a 
boomerang shape.        
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Figure 9.  Three-dimensional plot of embedded time series, X = 0.5, λ = 3.99 
 
 
As can be seen in all of the embedded plots of data generated by the logistic equation, a 
process which is known to generate data with deterministic chaos, a distinctive pattern 
emerges.  In the cases illustrated, they can appear as a line, an “S” shape, or boomerang 
shape.  In contrast, figure 10 illustrates an embedded time series of random data, taken 
from a normal distribution.  The data appears as a cloud clustered toward the center of the 
plot with no other pattern. 
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Figure 10.  Three-dimensional plot of embedded random, normal dist. time series  
 
In this study, the empirical data from Katrina contracts will be embedded in three 
dimensions, and then will be visually inspected.  If the data is composed primarily of 
deterministic chaos, the data should create a distinctive pattern similar to the results 
illustrated above in figures 5, 7 and 9.  If however, the empirical data resembles the 
embedded plot illustrated above in figure 10, it would not support the conclusion that 
there was deterministic chaos in the Katrina data. 
Investigative Question 2. 
Does this data reveal an underlying pattern that could be useful to management 
for decision making?  
If an analysis of data is found to contain deterministic chaos, the usefulness of this 
information is limited to knowing that the events were not random, but deterministic and 
possibly controllable.  This information may be helpful in creating a new paradigm, but 
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not in everyday management decisions.  If a system exhibits deterministic chaos, the next 
question becomes how to control the events.  How can managers determine when a 
system might undergo a bifurcation, or system change, and what should they do to affect 
the outcome?  Logistics managers need information that they can use to make better 
logistics decisions.   
Two types of limit-cycle models and a velocity plot were chosen as a means of 
providing feedback to managers on the disaster relief dynamics. These were chosen 
because one of the limit-cycle models was specifically identified by Priesmeyer and Cole 
as a means of management feedback for disaster response. They used the model on the 
combined disaster data, but the question remains, if it can be used by managers for a 
specific disaster.  This is the use apparently intended by Priesmeyer and Cole (Priesmeyer 
and Cole, 1996).  This model will be referred to as the disaster limit-cycle model.  The 
other limit-cycle model and velocity plot are similar to the first model.  They were used 
by Priesmeyer and Baik in another study using the limit-cycle model in a business 
application.  The other limit-cycle model will be referred to as the business limit-cycle 
model.  Since the business model limit-cycle was developed first, it will be discussed 
first.  Both types of limit-cycle models and the velocity plot, require two related 
variables.  In their business model, Priesmeyer and Baik used quarterly profits and sales 
as the related variables.  In the disaster model, Priesmeyer and Cole used fire 
equipment/personnel and Emergency Medical System (EMS) equipment/personnel as the 
related variables.    
In addition to these models, fitting the logistic equation to empirical data can 
provide feedback to the manager on the amount stability present in the environment, and 
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therefore the amount of control that may be possible. The logistic equation model will 
however, be discussed later.   
Priesmeyer and Baik claim that the business model limit-cycle and velocity plots 
can be used by managers to predict organizational performance to improve corporate 
decision making (Priesmeyer and Baik, 1989:47).  This is done in a multi-step process to 
first determine the points to plot for a limit-cycle, then to determine the points to create 
the velocity plot.  The first step in their business cycle model is to calculate the marginal 
or change in values for each variable:   
dij = xij – xi-1,j     (4) 
Where d is the difference between consecutive points, x is the value of the variable at a 
particular point in the time series, identified by subscript i.   The point just previous is 
subscript i-1, and subscript j identifies the variable, for instance sales or profit.  Next the 
mean value of the differences is calculated: 
                n 
     µj = ∑dij/n-1     (5) 
               i=1 
 
Where µj is the mean of the differences, ∑dij is the sum of for all i for a particular 
variable j, and n represent the total number of observations of i (that is the number of 
points along the time series).  The next step is to subtract the mean difference from each 
individual point differences resulting in the difference from the mean Dij: 
     Dij = dij - µj     (6) 
The next step is to plot the data for the limit-cycle.  The first point plotted is x = µj 
and y = µj+1 (x is the mean difference of the first variable, profit for example, and y is the 
mean difference of the second variable, for example sales).  Then, the difference from the 
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mean (Dij) for the first j, is paired with the difference from the mean (Dij+1) for the second 
j to create consecutive x and y variables for each point.  These points are then plotted to 
create the limit-cycle plot. 
The velocity plot is constructed by taking the two difference from the means (Dij 
and Dij+1) and multiplying them together to create the y-variable.  The x-variable is the 
time component, such as the first quarter, second quarter, third quarter, and so on.  The x- 
and y-variables are then plotted (Priesmeyer and Baik, 1989:16).   
The results of the plots are then visually observed.  Some companies in 
Priesmeyer and Baik’s study exhibited a one-period attractor, which on the limit-cycle 
plot appears ideally as data concentrated near the origin at a single-point.  These 
businesses had zero velocity (horizontal line).  Others businesses exhibited a two-period 
cycle, which was characterized by a diagonal line oscillating between points in the first 
and third Cartesian plane quadrants on the limit-cycle plot.  The ideal velocity plot for 
two-point limit-cycle businesses oscillated between two regular points (zero and another 
value).  The last group of regular business cycles was businesses with four-period limit-
cycles.  The ideal plot of four-period limit-cycle is a shape similar to the symbol for 
infinity or an eight on its side.  The ideal velocity is a line oscillating between four 
regular points (Priesmeyer and Baik, 1989:17-19).   
Likewise, Priesmeyer and Cole developed a simpler process for plotting a limit-
cycle by using changes in two variables.  For instance, the change in fire 
equipment/personnel would be the x-variable and change in EMS equipment/personnel 
would be the y-variable.  The x, y pair would then be plotted on a Cartesian plane to 
reveal information about the development of disaster relief.  If the plotted data moves 
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into the first quadrant (positive x and y), then managers would see that the need for both 
resources were growing. They could monitor the situation closely to see if it comes close 
to maximizing available resources, in which case they would need to request assistance.  
So, rather than looking for patterns as in the business limit-cycle model, the plotted data 
in the disaster model are used to diagnosis whether more or less resources are being 
utilized, possibly indicating a change in the disaster response development.  As with the 
above example, it may also provide an early warning of when the activities are likely to 
go beyond the limit of available resources, necessitating a request for assistance 
(Priesmeyer and Cole, 1996).   
 Investigative Question 4.  
Can the data be used to estimate the extent or limit of logistics support that would 
eventually be needed? 
 In a system characterized by deterministic chaos, information to discover the 
limits can come from the models already identified; therefore, additional models were not 
explored.  Analysis of the results from the business and disaster model limit-cycles and 
fitting the logistic equation can provide information that could be used to determine the 
limit of support that would be needed.  For instance, in the business and disaster model 
limit-cycle if the data reflects a regular limit-cycle, such as a period-one or period-two 
limit-cycle, then the limits of logistics support is established by the attractor/s.  That is to 
say, the limit is identified by the point or the points between which the data oscillates.  
Likewise, the logistic equation can be used to map system performance and predict its 
limit.  If the logistic equation is accurately fit to the data (significant F-value), and is able 
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to explain much of the variation (reasonable R2-value) then the λ-parameter can be used 
to identify the system limit. 
Methodology conclusion 
In conclusion, this research is a case study of federal logistics support during 
Hurricane Katrina.  It is concerned with analyzing data from federal contracts awarded in 
support of Katrina to discover if they might contain information useful for logistics 
managers and help them in decision-making in future catastrophic disaster relief.  The 
research design is a mixed methodology.  The data preparation prior to being used to 
compare the chaos theory models to the empirical data was discussed.  Several chaos 
theory models used in this research were examined, specifically the logistic equation, 
embedding, and business and disaster limit-cycle models and velocity plot.  It also 
discussed why these chaos theory models were selected.   
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IV.  Results and Analysis 
The objective of this study is investigate whether an area of complexity science 
called chaos theory can be used to extract useful information from the Katrina contracting 
data which can help managers make better logistics decisions during disaster relief.  This 
chapter will apply the methodology discussed in the previous chapter to the empirical 
data from the federal contracting database.  First, the raw data will be examined to see if 
any patterns or other distinct characteristics are present, then the data will be transformed 
for analysis and compared to the theoretical models.  The first chaos model to be 
examined is the logistic equation, followed by the embedding process, then the limit-
cycle models and velocity plot.  There are two limit cycle models used, the business 
model and the disaster model.  The results from each of the models will be summarize to 
answer the investigative questions.  Finally, a conclusion of the results and analysis is 
provided. 
Raw Data 
The first step was to plot the raw contract data, and examine them for patterns or 
other features.  The plot of raw data for contract-values (in dollars) is given in figure 11.  
As can be seen there is a particularly large spike in data on 2 September 2005.  On this 
day, approximately $750 million worth of contracts became effective.  This is accounted 
for by one contract valued at $250 million and by the aggregation of 869 less costly 
contracts.  Looking at the timeline of events during Katrina, this corresponds to the day 
after Michael Brown, the head of FEMA, said he found out about evacuees in the 
Convention Center and that he had not heard of reports of rioting and violence (“Big 
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disconnect,” 2005).  It was also the same day congress approved an initial Katrina relief 
package for $10.5 billion (“Congress,” 2005).  
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Figure 11. Plot of raw data for contract values (in dollars) 
 
 
The plot of the raw number-of-contracts data becoming effective on a given day is 
shown in figure 12.  As can be seen in this plot, there is a spike in contract numbers on 2 
September and 30 September 2005.  On 2 September 870 contracts became effective; of 
this number, 742 were awarded by FEMA and categorized as Firefighters/Community 
relations (“Katrina Contracts,” 2007).  The events related to this date are discussed above.  
The other spike occurred 30 September 2005, which coincides with the end of the federal 
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government’s 2005 fiscal year.  This date did not have any significant Katrina events 
associated with it, so the anomaly is probably related to the end of the fiscal year 
activities.  There is also a noticeable pattern in the number-of-contracts data.  This is 
created by a decrease every Sunday in the number of contracts becoming effective.   
There is also a relationship between the number-of-contracts data and the value, 
as one might suspect; however it was not a one-to-one correlation.  An analysis of the 
data correlation between contract numbers and contract-values data is 0.72, based on the 
raw data. 
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Figure 12.  Plot of raw number-of-contracts data 
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Value Bands 
The value bands used in the preliminary study were based on the categories 
established by the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR).  For instance, micropurchases 
are contracts valued at up to $2,500 and do not require competition. This limit can be 
raised to $15,000 during contingencies. The next category is simplified acquisitions, 
which is capped at $100,000 normally and $250,000 during contingencies, and finally 
commercial items which is normally capped at $5 million (Poole and Welch, 2005: 2).  
The result of plotting the raw data of the number of contracts in each value band was 
similar to the results obtained by plotting the number-of-contracts data.  Analyzing the 
bands in whole and by week resulted in findings similar to those based on the number-of-
contracts data.  In particular, the category of contracts under $15, which accounted for 
one-third of all the contracts, was remarkably similar.  Due to this similarity of results 
when using the contracts segregated into contract value bands and the aggregation of the 
contracts, using value bands as a means of analysis was not pursued. 
Testing for Chaos 
 Logistic Equation. 
 This study uses the logistic equation, in a manner similar to that of Priesmeyer 
and Cole in their study.  In this study X represents one day of logistics activity, measured 
as a percent of either the value of contracts or the number of contracts.  As with the 
earlier study, the λ-parameter is the unknown to be calculated.  The contracting data in 
this study was used to look at both the first ten weeks of Katrina activity as 10-week 
systems, and as one-week systems.  
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 The fit of a logistic regression line was first applied to the contract-values data 
based on the 10-week system.  This was analyzed by SBSS statistical software and the 
result is below in figure 13.  The curve appears as a typical, albeit nonlinear, regression 
line. 
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Figure 13.  Logistic curve fit to 10-week system for contract-values data 
 
The parameter SBSS estimated for the contract-values data was λ = 1.035, which if taken 
as a measure of environmental stability suggests the system is stable.  The F-value for the 
fit is 29.7, which is significant at alpha less than 0.001; however, the R2-value is 0.304, 
which means that approximately 70% of the variation cannot be explained by the 
regression line.  A similar analysis was made for the number-of-contracts data using the 
10-week system.   This fit is illustrated below in figure 14.  It should be noted, the fit 
appears closer than does the data in figure 13.  This is due to the presence of outliers and 
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a phenomenon known as the “King Kong” effect.  The King Kong effect takes its name 
from a theoretical study on the relationship of weight to height in a sample of gorillas in 
which one extreme value, King Kong, is added.  The addition of King Kong to the 
sample of gorillas skews the height and weight data and effects their correlation.  This 
makes it appear that there is a greater relationship between weight and height of gorillas 
than there was prior to adding King Kong (Makridakis, Wheelwright, and Hyndman, 
1998: 197-198). 
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Figure 14.  Logistic curve fit to 10-week system for number-of-contracts data 
 
SBSS estimated a parameter value for the number-of-contracts data of λ = 1.019, which if 
interpreted as a measure of environmental stability also indicates a stable system.  The F-
value for the fit is 13.9, which is significant at alpha less than 0.001; the R2-value, 
however, is 0.17 and indicates that the logistic regression line cannot explain 83% of the 
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variation in the model.  In both logistic regressions, there was a good fit to the data, but 
the R2-values suggest there might be a better model to explain the variation.  Also in both 
cases, results indicate the systems are stable; nevertheless, it uses one parameter to 
describe the stability of the entire ten weeks of relief operations. 
As mentioned earlier, the problem with analyzing a ten-week system is that it 
does not take into consideration changes in the system dynamics.  Each time managers 
make changes to it, the parameter will also likely change.  So, another analysis was made 
based on one-week systems.  Each week was analyzed using Excel Solver to find the 
parameters to best fit the empirical data using the logistic equation.  The empirical data 
was first put into an Excel spreadsheet along with the logistic equation.  A nonlinear 
algorithm was used in Excel Solver to identify the best X and λ that when applied to the 
logistic equation would most closely match the empirical data.  This was accomplished 
by assigning X- and λ-values as changeable cells in Solver.  The Sum Squared Error 
(SSE) was used as the object to be minimized.  Although a nonlinear algorithm was used, 
several systematic runs needed to be made to ensure the result was not just a local 
optimum.  Below, table 2 provides the result of the fit test of the logistic equation to the 
contract-values data.  The r-value in the table is the correlation between the fitted logistic 
equation and the empirical data for the week.  The closer the correlation is to one, the 
closer the fit is between the two models.  Note that weeks one, six, and eight of the 
contract-values data have high correlations and the associated parameter-λ is over 3.57, 
or in other words, they are in the chaotic region. 
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Table 2.  Logistic equation fit results for contract-values data 
Week 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
X 0.0008 0.500 0.865 0.081 0.202 0.028 0.336 0.003 0.111 0.007 
λ 3.66 1.22 3.84 4 3.88 3.72 4 4 4 3.92 
SSE 0.012 0.036 0.021 0.028 0.016 0.004 0.070 0.010 0.045 0.025 
r 0.97 0.37 0.72 0.84 0.88 0.95 0.64 0.96 0.71 0.86 
 
The same method was used to analyze the number-of-contracts data.  The results are 
illustrated below in table 3.  The r-values in table 3 are not as high as in the previous 
example table 2, and indicates the fit is not as close as with the contracts-value data.  
Weeks one, four and six have the highest correlations and also have parameter-λ values 
above 3.57. 
 
Table 3.  Logistic equation fit results for number-of-contract data  
Week 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
X 0.0005 0.141 0.068 0.068 0.928 0.022 0.93 0.93 0.069 0.908 
λ 4 1.8 4 4 3.93 3.58 4 4 4 2.68 
SSE 0.053 0.016 0.003 0.006 0.026 0.006 0.008 0.022 0.014 0.035 
r 0.95 0.50 0.89 0.90 0.71 0.91 0.85 0.74 0.77 0.55 
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It is interesting to note that in both tables, most weeks resulted in a fit that is in the 
chaotic region, the region with a λ-parameter 3.57 or greater.  It is also interesting to note 
that both tables indicate that week two was in the one-attractor stability range.  They had 
λ-parameter values between 1 and 3, but they both also had the least close fit.  Week ten 
was inconsistent in its measurement of stability when comparing contract-values and 
number-of-contracts data for the same week.   
As a visual illustration of how close the fit is based on the correlation results, two 
examples were embedded in two-dimensions and plotted so that the logistic data 
generated can be visually compared to the empirical data.  In the figures, plots based on 
contract-values data are on top, plots based on number-of-contracts data are on the 
bottom.  They also have the data generated by the logistic equation on the left and the 
empirical data on the right.  The two-dimensional embedded plot for week one is 
displayed below in figure 15.  In this particular example, the correlation was relatively 
high.  There was a slightly closer fit between the contract-values data with its logistic 
model, than with the number-of-contracts data with its logistic model.  The correlation 
between the contract-values data with its logistic model is 0.97, and the number-of 
contracts has a 0.95 correlation.  The similarity between the theoretical models and the 
empirical data can clearly be seen in the figure.  Another important characteristic of this 
plot is the horseshoe pattern created by the data.  This is characteristic of a system with a 
purely deterministic chaos dynamic in the chaotic region with a λ-parameter value of 3.57 
or higher. 
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 Horseshoe pattern 
Figure 15.  Plot of logistic generated data and empirical data for week one 
 
However, not every week resulted in a close fit between the logistic equation and the 
empirical data.  The plots for week two illustrate a lower correlation between the 
empirical and theoretical models.  This lower correlation results in the inconsistency 
found in the plots for week two exhibited below in figure 16.  Visually the empirical data 
does not resemble the chaos model for either the contract-values or numbers-of-contracts 
data sets. 
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Figure 16.  Plot of logistic generated data and empirical data for week two 
 
The other weeks also did not have a consistent fit with empirical data.  Some weeks had a 
better fit than others.  The average fit for the contract-values data is a correlation of 0.79 
and the average fit for numbers-of-contracts data is a 0.78 correlation.  Plots of weeks 
three through ten are exhibited in Appendix A. 
Investigative Question answered by Logistic Equation. 
Investigative question three asked, does this data reveal information about the 
level of control exercised by federal agencies in awarding contracts during Katrina?  
According to the results of the ten-week system, it was in control and stable.  However 
with a relatively low R2-value, using only one parameter to measure the first ten weeks 
does not appear appropriate.  The model could not explain most of the variation.  
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According to the one-week systems, most weeks were in or near the region of chaos.  The 
shorter timelines appeared to fit the logistic equation model to the empirical data better.   
The high parameter values would indicate that the systems were not controlled.  An 
interesting result is that the two-dimensional embedded plots for week one, which had the 
best fit, also resembled a purely deterministic chaos system in the chaotic region. 
 Embedding.  
 A three-dimensional model of the contracting data from Hurricane Katrina was 
created using the embedding process.  The time series was plotted using SBSS statistical 
software, because it has the capability to graph in three dimensions.  The result of using 
the contract-values data based on a ten-week system is displayed below in figure 17.  It 
does not appear to form any distinctive patterns as would be expected if deterministic 
chaos was present.  Rather, it more closely resembles random data, as plotted in figure 
10. 
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Figure 17.  Three-dimensional plot of embedded time series of contract-values data 
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Likewise, the result of using the number-of-contracts data is displayed in figure 9.  What 
appears to be a pattern toward the middle of the plot is a concentration of the data due to 
outliers (it is actually one outlier projected into three dimensions).  If the outliers are 
removed the plot also resembles random data, and is without pattern.  Note that the 
reason the scale appears small in figures 17 and 18 is that the data points being measured 
are as a percent of all values for ten weeks.  Therefore, each day is a small portion of the 
total for the 70 days.  The outliner is the spike of activity on 2 September 2005. 
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Figure 18. Three-dimensional plot of embedded time series of number-of-contracts  
 
Similar plots were made based on the one-week systems.  The problem in 
embedding one week of data is that with each dimension added in the embedding 
process, a data point is lost.  For instance, with seven days in a data set, a two 
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dimensional plot results in six data points, and a three dimensional plot results in only 
five data points.  It becomes difficult to ascertain if there is a pattern or not with fewer 
data points.  Combining the one-week systems together does not make it one system; 
therefore, putting them together does not result in a system recognizable as containing 
deterministic chaos.  For instance, figure 19 below illustrates the plotted data generated 
by the logistic equation that best fit each week of empirical data combined into one three-
dimensional plot.  It is not recognizably different from a plot of randomly generated data.   
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Figure 19.  Logistic equation generated data (used to fit contract-values data) 
 
The same is true for the values generated by the logistic equation used to fit the numbers-
of-contract data, exhibited below in figure 20.  What appears as a pattern in the center 
disappears when the outliers are removed.  Taking the outliers out also brings the plot 
into the same scale as in figure 19.  Note the limit of the plot in figure 19 is at 0.40 and 
the limit in figure 20 is 0.80.   Since the logistic equation generated data is known to 
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exhibit deterministic chaos yet appears as random data in figures 18 and 19, the empirical 
data would not be expected to be distinguishable from the random data either.  
Individually, plots of the weeks in two dimensions would resemble the comparisons 
made of weeks one and two in figures 15 and 16 above.   
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Figure 20.  Logistic equation generated data (used to fit number-of-contracts) 
 
Investigative Question answered by Embedding. 
Investigative question one is, does federal contracting data from Hurricane 
Katrina exhibit characteristics that can be explained by chaos theory?  After analyzing the 
various plots of the ten-week systems and one-week systems, the empirical data from 
Katrina does not appear to form a pattern as would be expected if deterministic chaos was 
present.  They appear to more closely resemble the plot of the random data.  The 
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exceptions are the two-dimensional plots for week one, which seem to indicate a strong 
element of deterministic chaos. 
Limit-cycle and Velocity Plot.   
Priesmeyer and Baik used limit-cycle and velocity plots to uncover deterministic 
chaos in business cycles (Priesmeyer and Bailk, 1989:47).  Likewise, Priesmeyer and 
Cole use a simpler process as a tool to manage disaster relief (Priesmeyer and Cole, 
1996).   
Before creating limit-cycle and velocity plots, two related variables are needed. 
This study uses the related variables of the value of federal contracts and the number of 
contracts becoming effective on each day.  Since the limit-cycle and velocity plots are 
meant to be management tools, rather than to identify if deterministic chaos is present, 
the data was analyzed only using the one-week models.  This also mimics the availability 
of data as it might be available to managers, on a weekly basis.  Managers would then 
evaluate the cycle process at the end of the week to determine if they needed to make any 
changes to the current process.  In reality, during a disaster this would probably be done 
on a daily basis; however, because of the limitations of the data, weekly information was 
used.   
 The result of the business model limit-cycle for each of the ten weeks is displayed 
below in figure 21.  It can be seen in this figure that activity within each week was in all 
four quadrants of the Cartesian plane.  The first week shows a pattern of strong first and 
third quadrant activity, the other weeks seem to oscillate along the x-axis.  Since the 
oscillation appears on the horizontal axis, this may indicate it is a one-attractor system 
with random noise (Priesmeyer and Baik, 1989:18).   
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 Strong 1st 
and 3rd 
quadrant 
movement 
Figure 21.  Business model limit-cycles for each of ten weeks 
 
The cumulative limit-cycle, illustrated in figure 22, also shows the same pattern of 
activity in the first and third quadrants as well as a pattern of activity along the x-axis.  In 
the examples presented by Priesmeyer and Baik, if a company was characterized by a 
one- to four-period attractor in the beginning, the rotation of data activity along the x-axis 
would be indicative of a movement toward chaos (Priesmeyer and Baik, 1989:21).  That 
does not appear to be what is happening with the oscillation in this case.  As mentioned in 
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the individual plots, after an initial shock to the first week, the plot appears to display a 
one-attractor system with random noise, with more variation in the dollar value of the 
contracts.  
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Figure 22.  Business model, 10 one-week systems cumulative limit-cycle 
 
The velocity plot of the data used in the business model in figure 23 shows no apparent 
pattern.  It looks similar to the empirical data for one attractor companies in Priesmeyer 
and Baik’s study.  The ideal velocity plot for a one attractor company is a horizontal line, 
so the pattern is caused entirely by noise or random error (Priesmeyer and Baik, 
1989:19). 
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Figure 23.  Business model velocity plot 
 
This study uses contract value and the number of contracts measured as a percent 
of weekly totals as the variables in the disaster model limit-cycle.  The information 
gathered from the disaster model limit-cycle has a different interpretation from the 
business model.  Rather than looking for patterns to predict future business cycle activity, 
the plotted data are to make a diagnosis as far as whether more or less resources are 
needed, possibly indicating a change in the disaster response development.  In the case of 
this study, data in the quadrants indicate the following: 
  Quadrant 1: Increase in both contract value and number  
  Quadrant 2: Increase in contract number but decreasing contract value 
  Quadrant 3: Decrease in both contract value and number  
  Quadrant 4: Increase in contract value but fewer contracts  
The shape of the data in the weekly plots of the disaster model limit-cycle is not different 
than in the business model, it merely shifts its position on the Cartesian plane based on 
the mean change.  In this case, the mean change is less than 0.003, so the shift is not 
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visually perceivable.  However, since the location of the plot in relation to the x- and y-
axis is important, the disaster model plot is available and exhibited in Appendix B.  The 
plots in figure 21 and 22 above indicate that after the initial spike in the change in both 
the number of contracts and their value in week one, the number of contracts does not 
vary more than 20 percent.  The change in value of the contracts varies by up to 40 
percent, but most weeks the change is approximately 30 percent.  It appears the plots 
might provide managers information concerning potential limits and cycle.  This is 
especially true in the number-of-contracts data.  The difficulty is in knowing whether the 
number of contracts suggests a limit to the number of people needed to award contracts, 
or does the number of people available to award contracts contribute to the limit 
exhibited in the plot?  This difference would probably be resolved by a manager familiar 
with the system being observed.  
Investigative Question answered by Limit-cycle and Velocity Plot. 
Investigative question two explores whether the data reveal an underlying pattern 
that could be useful to management for decision making?  Analyzing the data with the 
business limit-cycle reveals that the first week had strong activity in the first and third 
Cartesian plane quadrants.  Depending on the other data this could be a spike associated 
with chaos, or an oscillation between two points.  Based on the data in this study, the 
spike indicates movement into chaos.  Weeks two through ten exhibited a limit on the 
resources not varying beyond 40 percent in contract-values and 20 percent in number-of-
contracts data.  If these limits are not the result of a workforce constraint, this information 
might be useful to management.  It may indicate that from day to day the expected 
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change of contract values would not exceed 40 percent and therefore allow a prediction 
of worst case expected costs over a given timeframe.  
Results and analysis conclusion 
 The Katrina contracting data was analyzed several ways.  Initially, the raw data 
was plotted and spikes in data were linked to Katrina events, to see if they might offer an 
explanation.  Then the empirical data was compared to the theoretical models. 
 The first model was the logistic equation.  The data was analyzed using both ten-
week systems and one-week systems.  The ten-week systems indicated Katrina relief was 
stable, with one attractor, but the model could only explain approximately 30 percent of 
the variation at best.  Closer fits were made using the one-week models ranging from a 
high correlation of 0.97 to a low of 0.37.   The average correlation was 0.78 for the 
number-of-contracts data and 0.79 for the contracts-value.  This suggests a strong 
relationship, but not necessarily the same line.  The difference may be due to the addition 
of an element of randomness.   
 The next model was embedding the data.  The data was embedded into three 
dimensions and visually inspected for evidence of deterministic chaos. This comparison 
found the ten-week systems undistinguishable from a similar system generated by 
random numbers.  Likewise, combining the one-week systems into one database found 
them indistinguishable from a randomly generated one; this despite the fact the data was 
known to contain deterministic chaos.  Consequently, if the known chaos model is not 
recognizable from random data; the empirical data likely will not be either.  Therefore, 
the one-week empirical systems were not combined and embedded into three dimensions. 
71 
 The final analysis of one-week systems uses two limit-cycle models, a business 
model and a disaster model.  The result of the business model, suggested the evolving 
system had one attractor with random error or noise.  The disaster model also identified 
potential system limits.   
Taken together, except for the first week, the results of the tests for deterministic chaos 
are inconclusive.  Analyzing the data as a ten-week system reveals the chaos model is not 
a good means of explaining the empirical dynamics.   Utilizing one-week systems finds 
the chaos model more closely fitting the empirical data with the λ-parameter lying 
primarily in the chaotic region.  Embedding the data in three dimensions found the ten-
week system indistinguishable from chaos; however, embedding week one in two 
dimensions identified a good fit between the logistics model and empirical data.   
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V.  Discussion and Recommendations 
Relevance 
The purpose of this research was to find out if an area of complexity science 
called chaos theory could be used to extract useful information from the Katrina 
contracting data that would help managers make better logistics decisions during disaster 
relief.  This is relevant because if deterministic chaos is present in disaster relief 
operations, it would mean that events initially thought to evolve from random processes 
may actually be deterministic.   Furthermore, initial conditions during disaster relief will 
have a significant affect on the disaster outcome and some of these outcomes will be 
unexpected.  More importantly, it also means that some events during disaster relief that 
appear to develop from uncontrollable earlier events may actually be controllable. 
 This study also looked at two analytical techniques used by Priesmeyer and Cole 
to help disaster managers in decision making and to more effectively control disaster 
relief operations.  For instance, it tested whether finding a logistic equation that closely 
fits the empirical data might provide feedback that would allow managers to determine 
the level of stability in the support provided for disaster relief.  Also, the logistic equation 
might indicate if additional guidance/requirements on responders would be helpful or if it 
would nudge the support system into an area where control is lost.  Another technique 
analyzed was the disaster limit-cycle model.  The limit-cycle was used to see whether it 
could provide insight into what to expect in terms of the limit on resources and reveal 
cycles within the relief dynamics. 
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Reflections on the data 
 The result of looking at Katrina logistics support as ten-week systems did not 
reveal any evidence of deterministic chaos.  Fitting a logistics regression line to the data, 
provided a significant fit, but could only explain 30 percent of the variation at best.  
Likewise, embedding the ten-week systems in three dimensions resulted in a plot that was 
indistinguishable from a plot created by embedding random data.  
 Analyzing the data in one-week systems resulted in more promising findings.  
Although, the fit of the empirical data to data generated by the logistic equation varied 
from week to week; the first week resulted in a close fit.  Week one had a 0.97 correlation 
based on contract-values data, and a 0.95 correlation based on the number of contracts.  
Furthermore, the pattern created by embedding both systems into two dimensions 
resulted in distinct curves, somewhat like a horseshoe.  This is characteristic of a purely 
deterministic chaos system with a stability level in the chaotic region.  For instance, a 
two-dimensional plot of the same known chaos data exhibited in figure 9 creates a 
horseshoe shape.  This is illustrated below in figure 24.  This horseshoe pattern is evident 
in the empirical data from week one displayed earlier in figure 15. 
 
 
74 
Chaos 2D embedded plot
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0.03
0 0.005 0.01 0.015 0.02 0.025 0.03  
Horseshoe 
pattern 
Figure 24.  Two-dimensional plot of embedded time series, X = 0.5, λ = 3.99 
 
 Only data from the one-week systems were applied to the limit-cycle models.  
The models do not test whether deterministic chaos is present, but are models in which 
data containing deterministic chaos can be applied to reveal information concerning its 
dynamics.  This study found that except for the first week, the business model limit-cycle 
plots exhibited what appears to be a single-point attractor with random noise.  The 
velocity plot findings support this conclusion.  This indicates that the business cycle is 
stable and that the variation is caused by random noise rather than by deterministic chaos.  
The first week displayed a spike well outside the “normal” cycle, which would indicate a 
system in the chaos region (with a λ-parameter value over 3.57).  Furthermore, it 
indicates that the dynamic is an unstable business cycle and that the variation can be 
explained by chaos theory.  Both the business model and disaster models exhibited a limit 
both in the amount of change in the number of contracts and in the value of the contracts.  
The disaster model does not appear to offer any useful information on the development of 
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the response based on the Cartesian quadrant in which activity takes place, but perhaps 
offers information on system limitations. 
Research conclusion 
This research found what appears to be an element of deterministic chaos during 
the first week of logistics support during Hurricane Katrina.  This is based on the results 
of two tests.  First, it was possible to find a logistic equation model that fit the empirical 
data at 0.95 or greater.  Second, because when the empirical data from the first week is 
embedded in two-dimensions, it displays a pattern characteristic of a deterministic chaos 
system.  Furthermore, although not a test of chaos, the limit-cycle model results of the 
first week support the level of chaos identified by the two tests.  The tests for 
deterministic chaos in subsequent weeks, however, were inconclusive.  Also, because the 
level of stability during the first week was in the chaotic region and deterministic chaos 
in subsequent weeks could not be substantiated, the analysis could not test the value of 
the logistics model as an indicator of bifurcations that might offer managers feedback on 
the effects of their decisions 
The findings of this research conclude that initial conditions of disaster response 
will have a significant affect on the relief outcome and furthermore, some of the events 
during disaster relief that appear to evolve from uncontrollable events may be 
controllable.  It is therefore likely that managers can control the evolution of disaster 
response by the decisions they make prior to and during the disaster.  Unfortunately, this 
study was not able to substantiate the effectiveness of management tools such as 
matching the logistic equation to empirical data to identify bifurcation points in the 
system or using the disaster model limit-cycle to guide management decisions/policies.   
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Recommendation for further research 
 Further research into the application of chaos theory to disaster response should 
provide further understanding of this phenomenon and perhaps lead to more efficient 
disaster response.  One area for further research is changing the measurements used in 
this study.  For instance, the data in this study was limited to logistics activity measured 
by day and the most responsive systems consisting of seven days.  Having data 
measuring logistics activity by hour could allow a more robust analysis of what is 
happening during the first week of logistics support.  It may even be possible to look at 
how stable the system is on a daily basis.  Likewise, logistics activity may be measured 
using something besides contracts, such as by disaster commodities like water or meals 
served.  This study was concerned with federal logistics support; however, other logistics 
support systems could be evaluated.  For instance, did state or private relief agencies 
behave similarly as federal activity? 
Another area of research is in conducting a similar case study, but in parallel with 
other cases.  This study looked at one disaster, Hurricane Katrina.  Priesmeyer and Cole 
looked at several disasters with the data combined into one data set.  Another possibility 
is to compare two or three disasters with each other and with the theoretical model.  Does 
logistics support in similar disasters develop similarly?  For instance, do all hurricanes 
have the same level of stability in the first week?   
A final area of further research is looking at another branch of chaos theory 
concerned with the spatial evolution of a system.  For instance, how did the logistic 
support evolve geographically?  Did relief begin in several areas in isolation and then 
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combine as the relief capability grew?  Did it evolve in the way that fractional chaos 
would expect? 
Summary 
This study provided some answers to the research questions, but could not fully 
address the issue of using chaos theory to improve management practices during disaster 
relief.  This is due to inconclusive results in this study on the usefulness of the 
management tools presented.  Also, the scale used to measure the dynamics of the system 
created another limitation.  It was not small enough to capture the detail necessary to 
catch changes in the level of stability.  Nevertheless, the research does support the 
argument that there is an element of deterministic chaos in some logistics activities 
during disaster relief.   
Finding deterministic chaos during the first week of Katrina suggests a 
justification for using chaos theory at least metaphorically to understand logistics support 
during catastrophic disaster relief.  Consequently, the research findings support the 
conclusion that initial conditions of disaster response will have a significant affect on the 
relief outcome.  Furthermore, some of the events during disaster relief that appear to 
evolve from uncontrollable events may be controllable.  Therefore, managers are likely 
able to control the evolution of disaster response by the decisions they make prior to and 
during the disaster.  This is especially true during the initial relief effort.  In her research, 
Murphy uses the examples of the Exxon Valdez oil spill and the Johnson & Johnson 
Tylenol tampering event as contrasting cases of how disaster response can evolve.  In the 
case of Exxon, slow reaction to remedy the problem enabled a negative public perception 
to evolve whereas in the case of Johnson & Johnson, quick action led to a positive public 
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perception (Murphy, 1996).  One can only speculate how differently the relief during 
Katrina could have evolved if managers had taken advantage of preparation prior to 
landfall and made quick, decisive actions early in the disaster response.  Looking at the 
problems relating to communication, supply chain management and organizational 
behavior, it is clear that better preparation and clear, decisive action early in the disaster 
would have alleviated some of the problems.  The chaos of Katrina need not have been so 
uncontrolled. 
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Appendix A 
 
Plots for weeks three through ten are embedded in two-dimensions.  In the figures, plots 
based on contract-values data are on top, plots based on number-of-contracts data are on 
the bottom.  They also have the data generated by the logistic equation on the left and the 
empirical data on the right. 
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Appendix B 
 
 
 
 
 
Disaster model limit-cycles for each of ten weeks 
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